Abstract
Introduction
Wireless sensor network (WSN) is a self-organizing network with a large number of ultra-small autonomous sensor nodes which are designed to monitor information, collect data, etc., [1] . There exist lots of constraints in a WSN that make its security different from the conventional networks, such as the limited energy, resource and computation ability in the nodes, etc., Among these issues, pair-wise key distribution schemes are much more difficultly established in WSN than the traditional networks.
In [2] , Eschenauer and Gligor proposed a random key pre-distribution scheme (E-G scheme) for the large-scale network based on the probability theory. According to the scheme, each node selects a random subset of keys as its key ring from a domain pool. The neighbor nodes generate pair-wise keys only when they have at least a common key in their key rings. In the basic E-G scheme, Chan et al., proposed a q-composite random key predistribution schemes for sensor networks [3] (called q-composite scheme for short), and it is a well-known key distribution scheme. The neighbor nodes demanded at least q common keys in their key rings to improve the security of their links. Based on the multiple key spaces constructed by the use of Blom's scheme which have the threshold characteristic, Du, et al., [4] proposed another key pre-distribution scheme which substantially improved the security of the networks. This scheme will be called Du scheme for short in the following discussions. In [5] , Liu, et al., employed some polynomials in a prime field instead of Blom matrix to construct pair-wise keys, but it will increase the nodes' computation cost. Using the 
Network Model
In certain applications, the positions of nodes may be predicated, and we can employ the deployment feature to improve the local connectivity and the security of WSN. In Du scheme [4] , it was thought that the probability that the nodes will become some neighbor nodes airdropped in the same deployment batch is higher than that in the different batches. According to the theory, we divide the destination area into the different groups in our scheme.
Triangle, square and hexagon are three common network models, and we utilize the hexagon model for its large covering area advantage [10] in our proposed scheme. The node 3 position probability can be approximately estimated as two-dimensional Gaussian distribution. Each hexagon is called a cell as shown in Figure 1 . Assuming that the number of the cells is nt  and each cell is identified as 
Description of KPDK Scheme
In KPDK scheme, the pair-wise keys are established by the following four steps:
(1) Pre-distribution of keys and random numbers. . In addition to 0 r , three other random numbers (labeled as 1 r , 2 r and 3 r respectively which are chosen from the adjacent cells whose directions are the north, the southwest and the southeast to rr  , and their directions are shown in Figure 2 . It indicates that our scheme can ensure any two adjacent cells to share one random number.
Establishment of pair-wise keys:
There are two cases in the phase of pair-wise key establishment: one is the key establishment in the same cell, and the other is the key establishment among the neighboring cells.
According to the previous discussion, we can see that the nodes in is generated by the Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) . If U and V find more than one sharing keys when the nodes are in the same cell or in the neighboring cells, then they will generate more than one temp pair-wise key according to the above discussions by using each sharing key respectively. The final pair-wise key can be computed by XOR operation on the temp pair-wise keys. ( , ) g r x . The three random numbers If U has already possessed a key established in the process of the above key establishment, then it just need to store one of them.
Final Key Processing:
Thirdly, the nodes delete the all stored random numbers and some keys so that the number of the stored keys in each node equal to m .
Path Pair-Wise Key Establishment:
After the processing of the key establishment, it still may exist some neighbor nodes that can't generate their pair-wise keys directly, so our scheme will start the path pair-wise key establishment.
KPDK scheme sets up the path pair-wise keys using multi-hops. Considering the energy consumption in the nodes, it is important to set a threshold to limit the hops: if the number of hops is less than the threshold, then the pair-wise keys can be produced as the way described in Section 3.2.2. Otherwise, the nodes refuse to generate the keys immediately.
Performance Analyses and Comparison
In this section, we evaluate the performances of KPDK scheme, Du scheme [6] and qcomposite scheme [3] . In order to compare their performances, our analysis and simulations are installed as the following:
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Connectivity Analyses
In KPDK scheme, the local connectivity probability is considered in two cases: the probability that the neighbor nodes are in the same cell (denoted as Figure 3 shows the three probability curves c o m p of KPDK scheme, Du scheme and qcomposite scheme. The probability performance of the key establishment with neighbor nodes in the same cell indicates that the probability of KPDK scheme is larger than that of Du scheme when the nodes have the same number of the stored keys. Under the same condition, the local connectivity of q-composite scheme is the worst because it is a probabilistic scheme without using other effective measures. So the probability c o m p in KPDK scheme is the largest, while the probability in q-composite scheme is the smallest. As Figure 3 shown, a) The size of the domain key pool | ' | Sc extended by () hx in our scheme is smaller than Du scheme. Based on the work in [6] , we know that the size of the domain key pool in Du scheme is || Sc , where
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Take the given parameters for example. The size of the domain key pool in Du scheme is 1817 while the extended domain key pool in our KDPK scheme is 1375. Figure 4 shows the probabilities of key establishment with the neighbor nodes among different cells for KDPK scheme, Du scheme and q-composite scheme (q=1, 2). It indicates that the probability of d if p in KDPK scheme is higher than the other two schemes. This is mainly due to the following aspects:
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a) The size of the final extended sub-key pool , ij Sc in KDPK scheme is smaller than that in Du scheme, and the size of the adjacent shared key pools are expanded by the hash function to be twice as that of Du scheme. It leads to that the probability will increase when the same number of the keys is selected for the pair-wise key establishment in the neighbor nodes using the hash functions. b) Du scheme created the pair-wise keys based only on whether the two neighbor nodes have shared keys in a sharing key pool, but did not employed any other measurement. c) q-composite scheme regarded the domain key pool as a whole and would create a pairwise key when the number of the common keys in the neighbor nodes was larger than or equal to q. It did not use any deployment knowledge or other node information as our scheme does. It leads to that, under the same conditions, q-composite has the lowest local connection probability.
Hence, the probability p , our scheme shows the best, while q-composite shows the worst. Hence, as Figure 5 shown, the average network connectivity performance of our KPDK
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Copyright ⓒ 2014 SERSC scheme is superior to that of Du scheme, while the average network connectivity performance of Du scheme is superior to that of q-composite. 
Security Analyses
After the key processing phase described in Section 3.2, each node still stores m keys. As Figure 1 shown, the size of the original domain key pool is | |
Because of the adjacent random numbers and the using of a hash function, the sizes of the key pools with type Sa are extended three times as the their original sizes, that is to say, the sizes of the key pools with type ' Sa are extended six times as the sizes of the type Sa key pools. But due to the deletion of certain relevant keys, the enlargement of the key pools with type Sa can be considered as the extension of the domain key pool. For example, for the random keys 1 2 3 ,, r r r and a given key 0 x , the node will store keys 1 0 2 0 3 0 { ( , ) , ( , ) , ( , ) } g r x g r x g r x generated by Eq. (3), that is, the number of each key in the networks is three times as its original number. The domain key pool S is enlarged by the sharing random keys and ( , ) g r x . The enlarged domain key pool is denoted as '
According to the above analysis, when x nodes have been captured, the probability (denoted as , the lower the probability c p . Fig.6 shows that the link security at 5 0, 1 0 0, 1 5 0 m  when 1500 nodes are captured, respectively. If a and x are determinate, then it is clear that the more the keys stored in the nodes, the higher the probability c p , and so the lower the nodes' security. On the contrary, the less the keys stored in the nodes, the higher the nodes' security. Similarly, when a and m are determinate, the more the number of the captured nodes, the higher the probability c p , and so the lower the nodes' security. The following Figure 7 and Figure 8 show the relationship of the fraction of the compromised link between the non-compromised nodes vs. the number of the compromised nodes among the different schemes when the network connectivity probabilities are 0.33 and 0.5, respectively. We can see that the performance of KPDK scheme is the best. There are two key reasons for that our scheme is superior to the two other scheme in security. One is that the numbers of the keys in the nodes in our KPDK scheme is the smallest. For example, in Figure  5 and Table 2 , when the network connectivity probability equals to 0.33 and 0.5, respectively, the number of the keys in the nodes is respectively 30 and 44 in KPDK scheme, while the numbers of the keys in the nodes are respectively 46 and 68 in Du scheme, and it is respectively 200 and 262 in q-composite scheme (q=1), or is respectively 341 and 408 in qcomposite scheme (q=2). The other is that Eq. (9) shows that the size of the domain key pool in KPDK scheme will increase to ( 2 1) | | aS  instead of || S . If the number of the captured nodes remains the same, the number of the keys stored in the nodes, the higher the probability that the corresponding link is broken. It follows that our scheme has the highest security compared with the two other schemes since the stored keys in the final domain key pool in our scheme is the least. 
Storage Space Analyses
According to the phase of the key distribution and the establishment, the storage space of the nodes will increase during the process. Suppose that the average numbers of the keys including the random numbers in the nodes is M in this process, and let 1 M be the average number of the stored keys in the nodes without including the stored random numbers. 
Expansibility Analyses
When the network has run for a period of time, the node energy may run out and need to add some new nodes constantly. There are two ways to add new nodes: 1) Replacement of the dead nodes; 2) Extension of the network. Sa to replace 0 K successively, and the final sub-key pool will be formed. d) Each new node selects m keys from the final sub-key pool. Then, the pair-wise keys can be generated similarly as E-G scheme [2] did.
Replacement of the Dead

Extension of Network:
In Figure 2 , the server only needs to add some cells at the edge of the deployment area when the network needs to expand, it will construct the sub-key pools and distribute four random numbers according to Section 3.1. Finally, the new additive sensor nodes would be treated as those nodes that are used to replace the dead nodes.
Conclusions
Based on the deployment and the dual-key pools, we propose a novel key distribution for WSN in a cell model. Each cell has a key pool consisted of two types of key pool: type Sa and type Sb . Both the key establishment probability and the security are improved by the extended key pool of type Sa , the sharing random numbers and the hash function. Compared with Du scheme and q-composite scheme, the simulation results show that our KDPK scheme performs the best in the pair-wise key establishment probability, the invulnerability and the node storage space. Now, based on different technologies, some other key distribution schemes with different characteristics for WSN [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] have been proposed, and each of them has its own advantages and some disadvantages to some extent. In our future work, we plan to give a survey on the most representative key distribution systems for WSN and evaluate their performance in security, connectivity, the number of the stored keys and some others in their practical application scenarios. And we try to develop a more efficient key distribution scheme for WSN based on our survey and our evaluation on these most representative key distribution systems.
